ABSTRACTS

Sustaining Militant Movement: An Analytical Framework

S. Manohari Velamati
Research Scholar, South Asian Studies

Ethnic conflicts in the world have taken serious dimension with the rise of militancy. The nation-states got intermeshed in the web of resultant violence and bloodshed. For them, ending militancy became a challenging task. The causes for the rise of militancy are inherent in the society. Persistent discrimination of particular ethnic group in the socio-economic and political realms creates fear complex and a sense of deprivation. If peaceful and democratic expressions of their grievances are suppressed and ignored by the state, ethnic groups resort to violence. Many of the militant movements today emerged in this manner and demand for redressal of their grievances, by employing violent methods.

Militancy and its causes have gained more attention in the literature than the factors which sustain a group’s violence or its decline. There is a close relationship between the factors which give rise to militancy and conditions for its sustainability. When compared with other organizations, militant groups resulting from ethnic conflicts have sustained for longer duration. They face lot of setbacks and are also subjected to internal divisions. But, in contrast to other militant groups, they constantly thrive on nationalistic tendencies and the support of masses. Militancy is sustained by a combination of factors. Principally, they are related to structure of the group, its resource base and its international network.

Strong structural conditions are very important for the survival of a militant organization. Any organization based on ethnicity, creates a structure which is powerful and rigid. Such an organization cannot be easily diverted from its war mentality. The important components of organizational structure are its leadership, ideology, nature of its cadres, its organizational setup and its operational methods.

Another significant source of sustaining militant movement is availability of resources. For a movement to sustain itself, adequate manpower is required. In an ethnic conflict, militant groups have the advantage of obtaining automatic support from the ethnic community. The survival of militant groups can also be achieved by a good financial planning. A group’s requirements are met by funds collected from the people or through criminal acts such as drug trafficking and money laundering. Contributions from diaspora constitute an important source. Militant groups based on ethnicity have the advantage of getting resources from the diaspora. When the intensity of a conflict is high at home, it leads to mass internal displacement. Refugees who migrate to different countries form the ‘politicized diaspora’. The diasporic communities are mobilized by the militants for funds and propaganda.

Transnational support structure is an important characteristic of many contemporary militant groups. Their infrastructure in their home country can be easily detected and disrupted. But, as the present day militants operate internationally, it is difficult for the concerned governments to destroy their international network. This network is helping the militants in maintaining their support base by propaganda.

The militants’ capacity to create panic is enhanced with the augmentation of sophisticated weapons which are easily available in the international market. Militancy becomes tough to handle because of the inter-links between different militant groups. This solidarity among the insurgents of the world poses enormous threat to international security. Their reliability on each other militarily, financially and ideologically gives strength to carry out their operations more efficiently.

Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia with Special Reference of Nepal

Amresh Kumar Singh
Research Scholar, South Asian Studies

Multi-ethnicity is a socio-political phenomenon in most societies and in the present century; inter-ethnic cleavages, competition and conflict appear to have acquired a marked intensity. In the process, ethnic mobilization has posed varied challenges to many developed and developing states. The patterns of ethnic group mobilization have been complex and the demands are varied ranging from protest against discrimination, struggle for autonomy and secession. The first two demands may emerge to be issues for bargaining, negotiation and contention among the groups and the institutions of power at various levels. The demand for secession is generally non-negotiable as it threatens territorial integrity of the state. The principle of self-determination is the guiding proposition for the ‘autonomist’ as well as secessionist demands.

Over the past few decades the problems of ethnicity and nation building have attracted the attention of many scholars of diverse discipline. The South Asian region is ‘constellation of multi-ethnic societies’ is a challenging field. Ethnicity has been a critical variable in the ‘formation and reformation’ of the state structures in this area. Of late, the South Asian countries have been experiencing intermittent ethnic cleavages and conflicts of different magnitudes. The movements, which were autonomists before, developed an increased tendency for secession. On the basis of self- determination, they sought recognition as a nation. Some of the insurgent groups got involved in protracted guerrilla warfare against the state. Thus, South Asia became a kaleidoscope of latent, overt and explosive ethnicity.

Nepal is a multi-linguistic, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic nation-state. The relationship of state with the people had thus largely followed this division, making it a binary relationship. This approach has, however, neglected other sections of the people whose position had remained marginalized and oppressed from the Kathmandu- centric ruling class. Some of these groups are the Madhesis and Janajatis (ethnic groups). This paper attempts to explore this section of the community in relation to the different regimes of the various periods since the inception of Nepal. The paper argues that the during the Shah and Rana periods, the then regimes’ attitude towards the ethnic groups were one of total apathy mainly because they thought it served the regimes’ interests and awareness among the ethnic groups to fight for the rights was not emerged then. With the establishment of democracy that lasted for about a decade, it was thought that the position of the oppressed section would improve. However, this period also show the continuation of the domination by a few elite sections without much change in the ground that had been promised with the coming of democracy. This paper also argues that all the regimes shared similar character in the composition of the same ruling elite, irrespective of the nature and structure of the regimes, thus, the continued deprivation of the ethnic groups of their basic rights.

Democracy is the best way of government in modern state. In democratic regime diverse ethnic groups asserts their rights and able to preserve their language, culture, religion and consolidate their identity. While underlining the plural character of the society, the question of national identity, citizenry, rights both economic and political, have become important aspects of democracy. Nepali state is unable to fulfill the aspirations of diverse ethnic groups. The failure of democracy in Nepal has been attributed to several factors i.e. social injustice, unemployment, underdevelopment, problems of exclusions, lack of good governance and centralized power system, etc. In democracy also the dominance of hill Brahmin and Chhetri in the Nepali state and the exclusion of other ethnic groups in state affairs since the inception of modern Nepal. However, this period also show the continuation of the domination by a few elite sections without much change in the ground that had been promised with the coming of democracy. In the context of Nepal, which has undergone different ethnic and regional movements. Challenges to the state system have emanated from the fact that while diversity is recognized balancing it with an integrative model has been problematic because this has brought in complex dynamics of ethnic aspirations and political power. At the same time economic imperatives of governance had posed severe limitation to the exercise of power and fulfillment of aspirations. Nepal has adopted monolithic identity and has tried to deny diversity in their effort in nation-building.

The current political crisis and conflict should not be only taken as a threat to democracy but also be regarded as an opportunity for radical reform to address the root causes of conflict that have created and perpetuated poverty, injustice and social discrimination in this country. Democracy and ethnicity is complementary to each other in present context. Without democracy no any alternative system can address the problems of different ethnic groups. In the same way democratic system sustain to preserve the ethnic identity and their empowerment through their proportional representation in the state affairs and to allocation of economic resources for their development. Even if the ongoing Maoists insurgency ends, the existing social disparity and sources of conflict (extreme poverty, unemployment of youths, highly polarized social composition and regional disparities) would like to ignite more conflicts in the future. Devolution of power in the different ethnic community will safeguard the democracy in Nepal. Hence, paper suggests for a ‘qualitative transformations’ of Nepali society, state and polity.

Conflict Resolution: A case study of Afghanistan

Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Scholar, Central Asian Studies

State plays an important role in resolving ethnic conflict. Some of the methods adopted by multiethnic states are:

I. Methods for Eliminating Differences in Culture and Identity

II. Methods for Managing Differences in Culture and Identity

From time to time, the international system reorders itself — normally in the aftermath of a major conflict. This reordering is accompanied by the implementation of new rule sets. Policymakers have openly enquired whether the end of the Cold War and the birth of the information age require a new firebreak and the implementation of a new set of rules. Because “great power war” has been the proximate cause of past restructuring, and ordering the principle for international (and national) rules and institutions. Recent events indicate that a new ordering principle is required.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the world has paid a great deal of attention to Afghanistan. However, long before these events, Afghanistan was an area plagued with chronic unrest and violent conflict. Due to the lack of a strong nation state, much of this country’s violence has been self-inflicted, as conflicts have arisen between various ethnic groups. These ethnic groups form the highly segregated social units of Afghanistan. The conflict between the largest of these groups, the Pashtuns (or Pushtuns), and the remaining ethnic groups has been one of great ferocity and violence.

Transformationalist tendencies make us believe that an area cannot stay in conflict indefinitely. Eventually, it seems, some peaceful equilibrium must be found. Afghanistan however is proving quite immovable when it comes to finding permanent resolution between the ethnic groups. These ethnic groups become most unified when they fight against a common enemy. The difficulty in finding such a resolution is, in part, due to the lengthy history of conflict. Conflict has become part of the Afghan identity. The best potential solutions for the chronic violence that plagues Afghanistan involve the creation of a unified nation state, a step that Afghans uniformly resist. Perhaps given the course of recent events, Afghanistan can begin rebuilding its tattered country using the blueprints of more unified and central nation states. If this is accomplished, one can only hope that a sense of national community will quell many of the ethnic disputes that would otherwise result in violence.

Given Afghanistan’s history, it is hard to see any clear-cut resolution to the country’s conflicts. Even in the absence of foreign threat, the country is riddled with inner division and conflict. Any plan of action must work from the inside out; meaning we must first solicit a change in the Afghan identity before we can expect any change in the behaviours that it creates. Only a strong nation-state will be able to create any sense of national identity. Given the chance, the world community must make every effort to create such an entity. Hope for Afghanistan lies in its unification. Through changes in identity and loyalty, its people can hopefully experience some period of peace after so much conflict.

Ethnicity and Nation-Building in Myanmar

Sonu Trivedi
Research Scholar, Southeast Asian and South-West PacificStudies Division

The proposed paper on “Ethnicity and Nation Building in Myanmar” will begin with an understanding of the concept like ethnic groups, nation states and the process of nation building. The next section will deal with some of the significant salient patterns of ethnic conflict in the post colonial states of Southeast Asia. These are: Centre-Periphery pattern; Pariah entrepreneurial minorities; Balanced pluralism; and Irredentist struggle.

The third section will provide an overview of Historic and Ethnic Background of various communities in Myanmar. Historically, remarkable ethnic diversity existed in Myanmar. Some of the prominent ethnic groups are: Burmans, Karens, Shans, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Mon and Rakhine. There are several sub-divisions within these ethnic groups. Intermingled in different communities across the country, there are also Chinese, Tamils and other minorities of Indian origin. Language is another confusing denominator for ethnic identity. Over 100 languages have been identified in Myanmar. The rapid spread of Burmese over the last century has largely alienated other ethnic communities from the mainstream. Due to the existence of complex ethnic groups, Myanmar has often been called an anthropologist’s paradise.

The fourth section will provide an insight into the colonial legacy and its impact on the ethnicity. Although, charecterised by ethnic diversity, there existed in many areas a tradition of adaptation and mutual accommodation between the ethnic races. On the eve of British annexation there survived in many areas strong regional and ethnic traditions of independence. And it was these that British rule and the very manner of the British annexation were to amplify. Whatever unity did exist was shattered.

The fifth section will look into the impact of ethnicity on the process of nation-building. Since independence, governments in Yangoon have not, however been concerned with the anthropological niceties. Rather, the priority has been to establish the idea of a common Burmese identity shared by all the inhabitants of modern Burma. Rulers have followed straight forward policy of ‘Burmanisation of the minorities’. The Government has tried to impose it on ethnic minorities such as Arakanese, Chins, Kachins, Karens, Kayahs, Mons and the Shans. Cultural domination of the majority of Burmans came through the imposition of Burmese as the official language of the nation and the declaration of Buddhism as the State religion. This resulted in a simmering sense of frustration and the articulation of regional identities among the ethnic minorities. Evidence of this can be seen in the growing violence and the insurgency movements.

Finally the concluding section looks into the efforts made by government in accommodating ethnic pluralism. It also provides some prescriptions for the government to be followed in the future.

Secessionist Movement in Sri Lanka: Role of the State

Smita & Gulbin Sultana
Research Scholar, South Asian Studies

In most of the colonial societies, once the struggle for self rule is over and independence is achieved, contests over who should rule at home follow. These are generally ethnic and religious rather than class conflicts. In many cases these conflicts turned out as violent and the activists of the movement shift their identity and allegiance from nation state to ethno-nation and ultimately their demand extends from autonomy within state to complete sovereignty. This can aptly be illustrated by the ongoing secessionist movement in Sri Lanka.

Since 1983 Sri Lanka has been grappling with a bloody and violent Tamil secessionist movement. Though the movement took a violent shape only in 1980s, the root of the movement goes back to the communal riots and movements in 1950s and 70s followed by the “Language Policy of 1956”, and the “University Admission Policies of 1970-71”. After independence the Tamil communities felt a sense of alienation politically, economically and socially. In the initial years of the movement the Tamil demands confined to the larger power for the community within the nation. However with the change in leadership in 1980s the movement took violent path and their demand got extended to Tamil Eelam-a separate state for the Tamils. Though the activists justify their movement as struggle for self determination, the movement failed to earn international support and over the years it has become notorious for adopting terrorism and indulging in mass killing, displacement and massive violation of human rights. On the other hand, Sri Lankan state also has to face a lot of criticism for its inability to solve the ethnic problem despite of the international pressure and the peace process.

As mentioned above there is no doubt about the fact that the objective and fate of the movement to a large extent depends on the leadership of the movement. But the question of concern is what instigates the leadership to take such extreme step that too with such huge mass support. In other words what is the prime factor that mobilise the entire community to secede from the mainstream and form a sovereign nation of their own. It has been rightly said by KM de Silva that “the current ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a much more complex business than a simple straightforward confrontation between a once well-entrenched minority-the Sri Lankan Tamils-and a now powerful but still insecure majority-the Sinhalese.” The complexity of the movement needs a critical investigation and analysis and this paper aims to do the same. However the emphasis of the paper will be on the role of the state in instigating the Tamil secessionist movement in Sri Lanka as well as the limitations of the state to find solution to the problem and bring peace in the country. The paper will also try to recommend possible solutions to the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka.

ETHNICITY AND THE STATE: A CASE STUDY OF MALAYSIA

Rajeshwar Dyal
Research Scholar, Southeast Asian and South-West PacificStudies Division

Malaysia is a unique example of ethnic constitution where the state has intervened in favour of the majority ethnic group, namely, Bumiputera unlike the condition in many other developing countries where the state normally intervenes to protect the religious, linguistic, social and economic interests of minority communities. Bumiputeras who constitute slightly more than 50 per cent of the total population in Malaysia are politically powerful but economically weak in comparison with Chinese who are around 35 per cent and Indians (9 per cent). Therefore, to protect the economic interests of Bumiputeras, the state played an active role particularly after the violent ethnic clashes of 13 May 1969 when Bumiputeras attacked the economic interests of Chinese and Indians as it was becoming apparent that the Chinese-led Opposition parties will capture power from the hitherto Bumiputera dominated coalition government. This incident was a turning point in ethnic history of Malaysia as ethnic majority was threatening ethnic minorities led by the state. What followed thereafter was the affirmative policy on the part of the state to promote the economic interest of Bumiputera oblivious of its repercussions on ethnic minorities.

The state allocated sizeable resources by using various mechanisms like five year development plans to favour Bumiputeras in order to increase their equity participation. The justification for promoting economic participation was provided by the New Economic Policy (NEP) which was launched in 1971 to correct ethnic economic imbalance and eradicate poverty. As the NEP set a deadline to achieve 30 per cent equity participation for Bumiputeras by 1990, the entire state machinery was utilized to achieve this objective.

The open intervention by the state in favour of Bumiputeras created a sense of insecurity among ethnic minorities of Chinese and Indians. The latter were, perhaps, deprived from the economic opportunities that were created with the expansion of the Malaysian economy during 1970s and beyond.

Thus, it is against this backdrop of ethnic majority versus minority dichotomy that the role of the state needed to be probed thoroughly. How and why the Malaysian state succeeded in improving economic conditions of Bumiputeras without, perhaps, openly antogonising the ethnic minorities? Are the ethnic minorities feeling insecure/threatened or has the new political dispensation co-opted minorities in the nation building?. This paper will, thus, make a modest attempt to explore some of these underlying reasons for wider dissemination and discussions.

CHINESE POLICIES IN XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

Mahesh Ranjan Debata
Research Scholar, Central Asian Studies

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which is the largest province of the People’s Republic of China with Uyghur Muslims being the majority, borders three Central Asian Republics (CARs) - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Russia, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The Uyghurs have been demanding a separate homeland out of China, which is a major cause of concern for the Chinese authorities. Xinjiang has become a sensitive region because all the countries bordering this region, except Mongolia, are home to a sizeable Muslim population. In addition to this, Xinjiang’s geography, history, ethno-cultural and religious diversity as well as the abundant natural resources like oil, natural gas and other minerals have catapulted the region into one of the most important strategic regions of China.

The Chinese government since its independence in 1949 has been devising various policies towards the minorities in Xinjiang from time to time as part of its minority nationalities policy. The earlier policies immediately after the independence, during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution period resulted in simmering discontent among the Uyghurs which further led to violent activities against Hans as well as the Chinese government. With Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which provided an important thrust to the radical Islamic forces in Xinjiang, the religious factor became significant. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed horrendous acts of violence in Xinjiang including terrorist activities. The creation of newly independent Central Asian Republics, with whom the Uyghurs share a religious, language and cultural affinity, was a morale booster to the Uyghurs to further their demand for separate homeland.

Considering the gravity of the problem in Xinjiang in the recent days, the Chinese authorities have been cautiously making some favourable policies towards this northwestern region. The Great Western Development Programme is at the vanguard of the Chinese Republic’s economic policy, which aims at the all round development of the region and ending the alienation among the Uyghurs and other minority nationalities. Besides, the Chinese Central Government has been making sincere efforts to put down the separatist activities in this region. And particularly after the War on Terror following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Chinese authorities are unleashing crack downs on the terrorist elements, to secure the unity, integrity and stability of the country.

Language and Identity in Tajikistan

Athar Zafar
Research Scholar, Central Asian Studies Division

This paper deals with the origin and development of the Tajik Language through various phases and factors influencing the same. There were three stages Old Persian/Tajik, Middle Persian/Tajik and Modern Tajik. The Tajik language belongs to the Eastern branch of the Indo-European family of languages, which also includes Farsi, Pashtu, Dari, Kurdish, Baluchi etc. the major languages being Tajik, Yaghnobi and the languages of the Pamir and Badakhshan highlands. Tajik proper, spoken by over 10 million people, serves as the lingua franca of the peoples of the low land, the mountain Tajiks and the Tajiks of the Badakhshan highlands and is mutually intelligible with Dari of Afghanistan and Farsi of Iran. Languages that have influenced Tajik include Arabic, Russian and Uzbeki. Tajik of Afghanistan is affected by Pashtu and languages of India.

The first script of Tajik language was Cuneiform, subsequently many scripts were used beginning with Parseek, Arabic and Cyrillic was in vogue till independence of Tajikistan. The current issue of choosing a script and the policies of the Government of Tajikistan in this regard is also discussed here. Here it has been analyzed that how language and literature is being utilized to create separate Tajik national identity. The process of reviving Tajik literature began in the mid 1970s, the Tajik intellectuals and religious leaders formed a clandestine group in Qurqanteppe, a hundred miles south of the capital of Dushanbe. The Tajiks on both sides of the Soviet/Afghan border contributed to the effort. The revival of the Tajiki language was one of their most sacred goals. After gaining independence this process has been intensified. The Samanids whose court language was Persian are being claimed to be the first Tajik State. In this regard it can be mentioned that the new currency of Tajikistan has been named as ‘Somoni’. Their court poets like Rudaki, Daquiqi etc. are considered as Tajik national poets and the literature produced during that period is seen as part of the Tajik literature.

Other than Tajik there are other spoken languages too, which are in use in Tajikistan, like Yaghnobi- it is spoken by some 6000 speakers in the high valley of Yaghnov river in the upper ridges of the Zarafshan, it is a remnant of Sughdian, the language of the ancient kingdom of the Samarqand. Wakhi- they occupy the highest valleys in the south central region of Badakhshan, valleys of the Pamir and it the Wakhan corridor along the Wakh river. The estimated 29000 Wakhi speakers are distributed in Afghanistan, Pakistan and China also. Wakhi is not a written language. Shughnani- numbering about 20000 they are adherents of Ismaili Shiaism living in the middle valleys of the Panj and its tributaries the Gunth and Shab Darya. It is largest linguistic group among the six groups that constitute the Gorno-Badakhshan peoples. They failed in their attempt to establish Shugnani as the lingua franca and as a literary language for the region in 1920s. Rushani- they occupy the valley of the Bartang river in the north of Badakhshan range. The 20000 Rushani speakers are influenced by the Shughnans and Tajiks.

GENDER DIMENSION OF TRAFFICKING-MIGRATION NEXUS:
A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESH

Nisha Sengar
MPhil, South Asian Studies

The mobility of individuals, particularly of women, across national and international borders has increased considerably in South Asia over the past decade. Movement is central to both migration and trafficking and this commonality between the two builds a complex relationship.Howevever there is a fundamental difference between migration and trafficking. Migration is a broad general concept and trafficking is a sub- set or category of migration, the basic difference is that trafficking involves factors like force, deceit, threat, debt bondage or other form of coercion.

Migration can empower women with greater economic and social independence, it can also increase their vulnerabilities.Rdhika Coomaraswamy has rightly said that “traffickers fish in the stream of migration” .Women’s decision to migrate are often taken under conditions of distress and disparity thus heightening their vulnerabilities to various forms of exploitation, including trafficking. Due to underground and clandestine nature of this trade it is difficult to procure reliable statistics on the number of women and children affected by trafficking. A review of UNICEF indicates that two lakhs women and children are trafficked to Pakistan from Bangladesh. According to Centre for Women and Children Studies (CWCS) about 100 children and 50 women are being trafficked to foreign countries every month from Bangladesh. In the South Asian Regional trafficking trends has resulted in certain countries being designated as ‘sending’ countries or sites of origin, while others assume the role of ‘receiving’ countries or sites of destination. Bangladesh and Nepal may be characterized as countries of origin whereas Pakistan and India are both countries of destination as well as transit.

The increasing foregrounding of women and minors in the process of contemporary migration in the past decade is a consequence of two related phenomena, namely, the feminization of poverty and the feminization of migration. In the globalize market women and girls are increasingly being pulled as service providers to fulfill the demand for a vast array of personalised, sex services in the entertainment and sex industry, domestic work, and the marriage market In addition, their exclusion from the public world, gender discrimination and undervaluation in the economic sphere renders them as the ideal workforce to be exploited in low-paying work ghettos for maximum profit by the owners.

Thus, it becomes necessary to view migrations a continuum of events and not just as a one time event, and a gender based approach is needed to be adopted, including the interplay between the government and civil society organisations.Given the need to explore and address inherent linkages between ‘unsafe’ migration and trafficking, this paper attempts to outline the magnitude, dimensions, causes and consequences of trafficking in Bangladesh.